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Pointing is a conventional communicative gesture used by humans to direct others’ attention to an 
environmental feature. Several researchers have argued that pointing becomes so ingrained for 
humans from a young age that children often have difficulty interpreting the gesture in a novel way. 
Recent research suggests domestic dogs are also sensitive to human gestures (including points) and 
proficient in recognizing and acting on humans’ visual attention. We explored the role of pointing in 
dogs’ choice behavior and whether dogs, like human children, have difficulty interpreting the gesture 
novelly. In Experiment 1, we explored whether dogs would differentially follow a static human point 
when it was administered by a familiar or unfamiliar individual and that individual indicated or failed 
to indicate the correct location of a food reward. The results indicated dogs chose the container 
specified by the demonstrators’ point in the honest and dishonest condition. Demonstrator familiarity 
did not alter performance. In Experiment 2, we compared dogs’ propensity to follow a static point 
versus other cues (momentary point, standing location) when the cue never indicated the correct 
location of a food reward, which was either visible or hidden during choice. The results suggested 
dogs did not inhibit their approach to a location indicated by a deceptive static point even when the 
location of a reward was visibly available during choice. However, dogs used a deceptive momentary 
point or standing location to locate food in both visible and hidden trials. In Experiment 3, we 
explored if dogs could overcome their tendency to follow a deceptive static point. These results 
indicated dogs learned to inhibit their approach to a deceptive static point when the reward was 
visible during choice. However, when information about the reward’s location was later hidden, dogs 
reverted to following the demonstrator’s static point. 
 
For humans, pointing is a conventional communicative gesture used to 
direct the attention of others to a feature of their surroundings (Couillard & 
Woodward, 1999). At a very early age, human infants are skilled at using points 
and interpreting the points of others (e.g., Bates, Beningni, Bretherton, Camaionin, 
& Volterra, 1979; Franco, & Butterworth, 1996; Lakatos, Soproni, Dóka, & 
Miklósi, 2009; Schaffer, 1984). Some have suggested such pointing has special 
meaning for humans from very early in their life (Butterworth, 1995; Couillard & 
Woodward, 1999) and further that the knowledge of what a point means becomes 







For example, Couillard and Woodward (1999) studied three- and four-year 
olds’ ability to comprehend deceptive point gestures. An experimenter provided 
misleading cues about the location of a reward by either pointing to or placing a 
marker on the container without the reward. Overall, children performed poorer 
when the cue was a point rather than a marker. Children in all age groups were 
able to use the misleading marker cue, learning to successfully look under the 
unmarked container for a reward. However, the youngest children included in the 
study (3 years, 3 months) continued to follow the deceptive point over 10 trials 
while older children (3 years, 8 months and 4 years, 3 months) performed at 
chance during point trials. Overall, children appear to express sensitivity to the 
cues suggested by human pointing.  
Recent research suggests domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) are also highly 
sensitive to pointing as well as a variety of other human gestures (e.g., Agnetta, 
Hare, & Tomasello, 2000; Hare, Call, & Tomasello, 1998; McKinley & Sambrook, 
2000; Miklósi, Polgárdi, Topál, & Csányi, 1998; Soproni, Miklósi, Topál, & 
Csányi, 2001, 2002). In these studies, researchers often construct situations in 
which a human hides food in one of several distinct locations and subsequently 
provides a cue to the dog to indicate where the food is hidden. Generally, this work 
indicates that dogs locate hidden food at above-chance levels and via several 
different human cues. Such cues are diverse and include pointing to the target 
location, gazing to the target location (head and eyes oriented to the target either 
dynamically or statically), bowing or nodding to the target location, and placing a 
marker in front of the target location. Some dogs also show the ability to use an 
eye glance alone to locate food either spontaneously or following training. 
Subsequent studies have revealed that dogs can use relatively novel gestures such 
as pointing with the leg (Lakatos et al., 2009). Interestingly, successful 
performance is not limited to adult canines, as dogs under six months of age are 
also skillful in using basic gestural cues (e.g., Agnetta et al., 2000). Dogs also 
appear more skillful than wolves (Canus lupus) in many tasks involving action 
based on human gestures (e.g., Frank & Frank, 1983; Hare, Brown, Williamson, & 
Tomasello, 2002; Miklósi, Kubinyi, Topál, Gácsi, Virányi, & Csányi, 2003), 
leading some to propose that the ability to understand human-given gestures within 
a social context is a product of domestication. However, others have found 
evidence suggesting domestication is not a prerequisite for understanding human 
gestures (e.g., Udell, Dorey, & Wynne, 2008; Virányi, Gácsi, Kubinyi, Topál, 
Belényi, Ujfalussy, et al., 2008). 
Recent research with dogs suggests that they, like human children, show 
difficulty interpreting a human point in a novel (or contradictory) way (Petter, 
Musolino, Roberts, & Cole, 2009). In several studies, dogs chose between two 
containers, only one of which contained a food reward. A cooperative human 
pointed to the baited container on some trials while a deceptive human pointed to 
the non-baited container on other trials. As expected, dogs learned to approach the 
cooperative human more often than the deceptive human. However, they continued 
to approach the deceiver on many trials despite not receiving a food reward for 







as a cue to the location of food reward. However, the role of the human indicator’s 
point in this continued approach was not directly evaluated. 
 Here, we explore the role of pointing in dogs’ choice behavior and 
whether dogs, like human children, have difficulty interpreting the gesture in a new 
(contradictory) way. In effect, we evaluated whether dogs could inhibit their 
approach in response to a human demonstrators’ pointing cues when the 
demonstrator indicated an incorrect location of a food reward.  
To accomplish this, in Experiment 1 we explored whether dogs would 
differentially follow a static human point when it was administered by a familiar or 
unfamiliar individual and that individual indicated or failed to indicate the correct 
location of a food reward. Importantly, Experiment 1 also allowed us to develop a 
baseline for dogs’ general propensity to follow a point cue in our paradigm, to 
which we could compare other types of human gesturing. In Experiments 2 and 3, 
we compared dogs’ propensity to follow a point versus other cues when the cue 
administered never indicated the correct location of a food reward and the reward 




 We first evaluated whether dogs would differentially follow a static human 
point when it indicated or failed to indicate the location of a food reward. 
Additionally, we investigated the role of familiarity with the deceiver. We 
reasoned that dogs might have more experience following the pointing gestures of 
their owner and would therefore be more likely to continue to follow these gestures 
than those of an unfamiliar human demonstrator even when not rewarded for this 
action. We also reasoned that dogs would be more likely to refuse to make choices 
when incorrect points were administered by an unfamiliar individual.  
Evidence suggesting familiarity might play a role in dogs’ responses in 
object choice tasks was obtained recently by Elgier and colleagues (Elgier, 
Jakovcevic, Mustaca, & Bentosela, 2009). More specifically, they found that 
extinction was slower but reversal learning was faster when the owner gave a cue 
(a static point) compared with an unfamiliar stranger. In their extinction task, dogs 
encountered trials in which a demonstrator pointed at one of two locations. 
However, neither location contained food. In their reversal task, dogs encountered 
trials in which a demonstrator pointed at one of two locations. However, the non-
indicated location contained food. The reversal task involved two phases. First, 
dogs were first physically led to the non-indicated location by a handler while the 
demonstrator pointed at the unbaited container during an “instigation” phase to aid 
dogs in learning that the reinforcer was not contained in the container the 
demonstrator indicated. In subsequent reversal trials, dogs were allowed to make 
choices between a non-indicated container containing food and an indicated 
container not containing food. Choices to the non-indicated container were 
rewarded while those to the indicated container were corrected. 
In Experiment 1, we sought to evaluate whether dogs would differentially 







individual and indicated or failed to indicate the location of a food reward absent 
extinction or instigation training like that employed by Elgier and colleagues 
(Elgier et al., 2009). We felt this was important as it allowed us to develop a 
baseline for dogs’ general propensity to follow a pointing cue in our paradigm to 
which we could then compare other types of human gesturing. To this end, a 
demonstrator, who was either honest (always unfamiliar to the dog) or dishonest 
(familiar or unfamiliar to the dog), gained the dog’s attention and displayed a treat. 
Next, the demonstrator secretly hid the treat in one of two containers. In the honest 
condition, the demonstrator moved from a neutral position to statically point to the 
correct location of the treat. In the dishonest condition, the demonstrator moved 
from a neutral position to statically point to the incorrect location. The dog was 
then allowed to freely approach the containers, and the demonstrator gave the dog 
the contents of the first container to which the dog approached. If the dog picked 
the empty container, the experimenter retrieved the treat from the correct 
container, showed it to the dog, and pretended to eat it. The honest demonstrator 
was always an unfamiliar human experimenter, but the dishonest demonstrator was 
either an unfamiliar human experimenter or the dog’s owner. When the owner 
served as the demonstrator, an experimenter held the dog at the start position.  
Importantly, recent work by Fiset, Beaulieu, and Landry (2003) indicates 
that dogs’ can accurately locate hidden objects at levels above-chance after up to a 
240 s delay. Thus, it seems unlikely that any inability to find the food reward 
would be indicative of a memory deficit for the food’s actual location after a short 
delay. Additionally, many researchers have investigated dogs’ abilities to infer the 
location of a reward (e.g., Collier-Baker, Davis, & Suddendorf, 2004; Watson, 
Gergely, Csanyi, Topal, Gacsi, & Sarkozi, 2001). Although many such studies 
have concluded it is likely that dogs solve classical tasks of inference like invisible 
displacement through associative mechanisms, others have found evidence of more 
sophisticated inference abilities (e.g., Aust, Range, Steurer, & Huber’s 2008 work 






 Owners and their dogs were recruited through personal contact with the laboratory staff or 
via fliers in the community. Participation was voluntary and limited to dogs over one year of age. 
Dogs had not received any advanced obedience training. Their owners also reported them to be free 
from major health problems (e.g., arthritis). Laboratory staff pointed out to the owners that there were 
no right or wrong behaviors and that they were not to help their dog.  
 As described below, before exposure to experimental trials all dogs completed pretraining 
to ensure they would make choices freely from two containers. Sixteen dogs (M = 4.7 years, SD = 
2.8, 7 females, 9 males) successfully completed this pretraining and were included in the study. Two 
dogs were excluded due to a side bias during pretraining (i.e., making choices from only one of two 
possible containers); 1 additional dog was excluded due to failure to acclimate to the laboratory room 











Two plastic, opaque green cylindrical containers were employed (38 cm tall; 22 cm 
diameter). The bottom of each container contained approximately 2.5 cm of cotton batting secured by 
duct tape. The containers were false-baited throughout pretraining and all experimental trials to 
control for possible use of olfactory cues. False-baiting was accomplished by placing 20 dog treats 
below the cotton batting in each container. The insides of each container were also rubbed with treats 
frequently. Commercial dog treats (3 cm X 1.25 cm) were used as rewards. A large opaque tablecloth 




All procedures were approved by the college’s Animal Care and Use Committee. Testing 
occurred in a room within the laboratory. The dog’s owner was present throughout all testing 
sessions.  
 First, dogs were allowed to become familiar with test apparatus and their general 
surroundings by exploring unhindered while their owner completed various forms regarding the 
dog’s general health, disposition, and training (approximately 10-15 min). Following this acclimation 
period, all dogs underwent pretraining. 
  The goal of pretraining was to accustom the dog to the containers. We permitted the owner 
to make short general commands to stay, sit, and release. During pretraining, the containers were 
positioned 1.5 m apart, and the dog was positioned to sit on a floor marking approximately 3 m 
equidistant from the containers.  
The experimenter then stood in the middle of the containers in front of the dog and showed 
a treat to the dog. As the dog watched, she placed the treat inside one of the two opaque containers 
(counterbalanced across subjects). She then returned to a neutral position equidistant from both 
containers and looked straight ahead. The dog was then released and allowed to retrieve the treat. 
During the choice, the experimenter continued to look straight ahead.  
If the dog chose the correct container, it was given the treat. If the dog chose the incorrect 
container, the experimenter left the center position and moved to the baited container to retrieve the 
treat. She then showed the dog the treat and pretended to eat it. The experimenter then moved to the 
next pretraining trial. Dogs received only two pretraining trials for each container. Only dogs that 
successfully completed pretraining by correctly locating food reward in all four pretraining trials 
continued to the experimental phase. 
Two types of test trials were conducted: “honest” and “dishonest”. For the test trials, the 
containers were positioned 1.5 m apart from each other and 3 m in front of the dog. The demonstrator 
stood behind and between the containers in front of the dog. Both the dog and demonstrator were 
equidistant from both containers. In this experiment, one unfamiliar demonstrator gave accurate 
information (honest trials), whereas another demonstrator gave inaccurate information (dishonest 
trials). The honest demonstrator was always an unfamiliar person to the dog. However, for one group 
(8 dogs) the dishonest demonstrator was a second unfamiliar person to the dog while for another 
group (8 dogs) the dishonest demonstrator was their owner.  
In honest trials, the demonstrator gained the dog’s attention and displayed a treat. The 
dog’s view was then hidden by a tablecloth or by covering its eyes while the demonstrator placed the 
treat in one of the two containers (counterbalanced across trials and subjects). Next, she returned to 
stand behind the containers, equidistant from both. When she had returned to this neutral position, the 
tablecloth was lowered or the dog’s eyes were uncovered. Then, with the dog watching, she moved to 
stand behind the container bearing the treat. She bent at the waist and used her index finger to point at 
the container holding the treat such that the tip of her finger was approximately 12 cm-24 cm above 
the container’s rim. The dog was then allowed to make a choice. A choice was defined as the first 
container the dog approached within approximately 5 cm of its snout. If the dog chose correctly (i.e., 
picked the container the treat was in), it was allowed to consume the treat. If the dog chose 
incorrectly (i.e., picked the container not holding the treat), the demonstrator removed the treat from 
the correct container. She showed it to the dog and then pretended to consume it. If dogs failed to 







exactly resembled the honest trials except that the demonstrator pointed to the container the treat was 
not in.  
Trials were run in 4 blocks of 6 trials each in the following order: “honest block 1”, 
“dishonest block 1”, “dishonest block 2” and “honest block 2”. The trials were blocked in this 
manner so we could first ensure dogs used the static pointing gesture to find food before providing 
incorrect information in the dishonest blocks. A second block of honest trials was run following the 
two sets of dishonest trials to ensure dogs were still motivated to find food (e.g., that they had not 




Digital videos (30 frames/s) were analyzed using Adobe Premiere Elements7.0 software by 
naïve coders. Responses were counted as correct only when the dog located the treat on the first 
choice. The maximum time dogs were allocated to make a choice was 60 s. One-quarter of all trials 
were scored by an additional coder (interobserver reliability: κ = 0.96). We then employed 
appropriate repeated measures Analyses of Variance (ANOVA) and post hoc tests to examine dogs’ 
choices. Effects were considered significant only if p < 0.05. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
 Dogs’ choices are depicted in Figure 1. To analyze the choices dogs made, 
we first conducted a Group (familiar vs. unfamiliar dishonest demonstrator) X 
Trial Type (honest vs. dishonest) X Block mixed model ANOVA. This indicated a 
main effect for trial type (F(1,14) = 2693.10, p < 0.01) and block (F(1,14) = 5.73, 
p = 0.03). No interactions were significant at the p < 0.05 level. Next, we 
conducted paired-sample t tests to further explore these effects. We compared the 
number of correct choices overall in the honest and dishonest conditions. This 
revealed that dogs chose correctly significantly more often in the honest condition 
than the dishonest condition (t(15) = 51.43, p < 0.01). However, no significant 
differences were seen between dogs’ pattern of choices for the first block of honest 
trials and the second block of honest trials (t(15) = 1.46, p = 0.16), nor between the 
first block of dishonest trials and the second block of dishonest trials (t(15) = 1.73, 
p = 0.10). This suggests that dogs’ choices were consistent across trials, indicating 
a lack of a learning effect for both the honest and dishonest conditions. 
Finally, we compared the number of trials in which dogs did not make 
choices using a Group (familiar vs. unfamiliar dishonest demonstrator) X Trial 
Type (honest vs. dishonest) mixed model ANOVA. This revealed a significant 
main effect of Group (F(1,14) = 5.94, p = 0.03) and Trial Type (F(1,14) = 8.57,     
p = 0.01). Additionally, a significant Group X Trial Type interaction was found 
(F(1,14) = 5.13, p = 0.04). Subsequent independent-samples t tests indicated that 
dogs made significantly more no choice responses when an unfamiliar person gave 
incorrect information than when their owner gave incorrect information (t(8) = 
2.39, p = 0.04). Thus, in the absence of definitive information on the location of 
the treat, dogs nevertheless were more likely to enact a response in reference to 
their owner relative to an unfamiliar person. 
Overall, dogs correctly chose the container holding the treat in the honest 
condition but not the dishonest condition. In both conditions, dogs chose the 







chance. However, dogs only made no choice responses in the dishonest condition 
when the demonstrator was an unfamiliar individual. Dogs’ poor performance in 
the dishonest condition suggests they were not relying on differential olfactory or 
auditory information, if it was available, to locate treats. These results suggest that 
dogs readily follow a human’s point cue, even when the cue does not provide 
useful information on locating a food reward and the person administering the cue 
is an unfamiliar individual. However, the procedure that we adopted in this 
experiment might have biased dogs to follow a demonstrator’s point. More 
specifically, all dogs first encountered an honest demonstrator before encountering 
a dishonest demonstrator. Additionally, dogs were only given a small number of 
trials within Experiment 1. We sought to resolve these issues, as well as compare 
the static pointing cue used in Experiment 1 to other possible cues in Experiments 




Figure 1. Proportion of correct choices for honest and dishonest trials in Experiment 1 collapsed 
across blocks. Results are depicted by whether the dog was deceived by an unfamiliar demonstrator 
or their owner in the dishonest trials. Honest trials were always conducted by an unfamiliar 




 The purpose of Experiment 2 was twofold. First, we wanted to explore 
whether dogs would continue to approach a non-baited container indicated by a 
deceptive demonstrator through pointing even when they could visually see the 
contents of the baited and unbaited container throughout the choice trial. Second, 
we compared a demonstrator’s static pointing to the unbaited container (static 







standing behind the unbaited container (stand), as well as a condition in which the 
demonstrator gave no cues regarding the baited location (no cue). Given that in 
Experiment 1 dogs overall were able to correctly locate treats in honest trials, 





The subjects were similar to those included in Experiment 1 and were recruited in a similar 
manner. In total, 32 dogs (M = 3.8 years, SD = 3.1, 17 females,) successfully completed pretraining 
and were included in the study. One dog was excluded due to nervousness prior to pretraining, and a 
second was excluded due to food aggression during pretraining (i.e., research personnel determined 




Two rectangular clear glass containers were employed (10 cm X 10 cm X 22 cm). A thin 
swath of white foam was placed in the bottom of each container (10 cm X 10 cm X 0.5 cm). This 
heightened the contrast between the brown dog treats used and the containers’ bottoms. The 
containers were false-baited throughout pretraining and all experimental trials to control for the 
possible use of olfactory cues. False-baiting was accomplished by securing dog treats to the underside 
(non-visible portion) of the white foam located at the bottom of each container. Additionally, the 
insides of each container were rubbed with treats frequently. Two opaque, florescent pink cylindrical 
occluders were also utilized (22 cm tall X 7.5 cm circumference). We also employed a large 
rectangular, black board (50 cm X 75 cm). Similar commercial dog treats to those employed in 




Pretraining and experimental procedures were similar to Experiment 1 with several 
exceptions. First, after pretraining, only dishonest experimental trials were conducted and the 
demonstrator was always an unfamiliar experimenter. For each group, 2 blocks of 6 trials were 
conducted: Visible and Hidden. Visible trials were always conducted first, followed by hidden trials. 
In all trials, the dog was positioned 1.5 m from the containers. 
In visible trials, dogs watched as the demonstrator displayed a treat and visited both 
containers. However, she only deposited a treat into one container. The location of the treat was 
visible to the dog through the clear walls of the container. The demonstrator was careful to act 
equally on each container. Next, she returned to stand equidistant from both containers. Then, she 
displayed one of four actions depending on the dog’s group membership (8 dogs per group): static 
point, momentary point, stand, or no cue. The static point exactly resembled the static point described 
in Experiment 1. The momentary point resembled the static point with the exception that the 
demonstrator stood between the two containers and pointed with the arm closest to the unbaited 
container for approximately 1 s before looking straight ahead. In the stand condition, the 
demonstrator simply stood behind the incorrect container while looking straight ahead. Finally, in the 
no cue condition, the demonstrator continued to stand between the two containers while looking 
straight ahead. Following the demonstrator’s cue, the dog was allowed to choose a container; treats 
were dispensed as in Experiment 1.  
Hidden trials resembled visible trials with the exception that pink opaque occluders were 
inserted within the clear containers, making it impossible for the dog to see where the treat was 
located through the walls of the container. In these trials, dogs saw the demonstrator display a treat. 
The demonstrator then moved the treat behind the large board. She then closed her fist around the 
treat to further ensure the treat was obscured from view. She moved to visit each container, lowering 
her closed fist into each. During one visit, she deposited the treat. However, before removing her 







demonstrator’s actions where the treat was deposited as the treat was always hidden from view. Next, 
she displayed one of four actions depending on the dog’s group membership as described above and 




All experimental trials were recorded and analyzed in a similar manner to Experiment 1. 
Interrater reliability was κ = 0.93. 
 
Results and Discussion 
  
Figure 2 depicts dogs’ choices in each condition for the two trial types. To 
analyze dogs’ choices, we first conducted a Group (static point, momentary point, 
stand, or no cue) X Trial Type (visible vs. hidden) mixed model ANOVA. This 
indicated a main effect for group (F(3,28) = 20.39, p < 0.01) and trial type (F(1,28) 
= 14.50, p < 0.01). No interactions were significant at the p < 0.05 level. This 
suggested that overall dogs chose correctly more often in the visible than hidden 
trials. Subsequent independent-samples t tests indicated that the static point group 
differed significantly from all other groups for both visible (stand: t(14) = 2.63, p = 
0.04; momentary point: t(14) = 3.19, p < 0.01; no cue: t(14) = 2.29, p = 0.04) and 
hidden trials (stand: t(14) = 9.32, p < 0.01; momentary point: t(14) = 8.22, p < 
0.01; no cue: t(14) = 7.10, p < 0.01). However, the remaining groups did not differ 
significantly from each other at the p < 0.05 level. Next, we explored the 
performance of dogs in each condition using one-sample t tests for visible and 
hidden trials. In visible trials, the momentary point (t(7) = 5.23, p < 0.01), stand 
(t(7) = 7.18, p < 0.01), and no cue (t(7) = 3.97, p < 0.01) groups successfully 
located the food reward at above-chance levels while the static point (t(7) = 0.74, p 
= 0.48) group did not. In hidden trials, only subjects in the momentary point (t(7) = 
2.50, p = 0.04) and stand (t(7) = 2.48, p = 0.04) conditions successfully located the 
food reward at above-chance levels. In hidden trials, the no cue group did not 
significantly differ from chance (t(7) = 1.83, p = 0.11), while the static point group 
chose the container indicated by the demonstrator at above-chance levels (t(7) = 
16.99, p < 0.01).  
Overall, dogs correctly chose the baited container when information about 
which container the treat was in was visibly available during their choice after 
watching the demonstrator momentarily point to the unbaited container, stand 
behind the unbaited container, and give no cues. However, dogs watching the 
demonstrator statically point at the non-baited container did not correctly choose 
the container containing the treat in visible trials even though information 
regarding the treat’s location was visibly available to them at the time of choice. 
Dogs in the momentary point and stand conditions were able to continue correctly 
choosing the treat’s location in hidden trials when they were not given direct 
information about where the treat was placed nor able to see the treat’s location 
during their choice during hidden trials. However, dogs were unable to choose the 
correct location in the no cue or static point conditions in hidden trials. During 
these trials, dogs in the static point condition chose the container indicated by the 







performance in the no cue condition in hidden trials suggests that they were not 
relying on differential olfactory information, if it was available, to locate treats. 
Additionally, dogs’ performance in the visible and hidden static point condition, as 
well as dogs’ performance in the no cue condition suggests they were not relying 
on differential auditory information, if it was available, to locate treats.  
These results suggest dogs have difficulty inhibiting their approach to a 
location indicated by a static point even when the location of a reward is visibly 
available to them during choice. Given these results, we wondered whether dogs 
could learn to overcome their tendency to follow a static point when the location of 




 In Experiments 1 and 2, dogs showed difficulty inhibiting behavior to a 
unbaited location indicated by a static pointing gesture—even when the location of 
the food reward was visibly available to them during choice. In Experiment 3, we 
explored whether dogs could overcome their tendency to follow a static point if 




Figure 2. Proportion of correct choices for visible and hidden trials in Experiment 2. Results are 







The subjects were similar to those included in Experiments 1 and 2 and were recruited in a 
similar manner. In total, 8 dogs (M = 3.9 years, SD = 2.5, 3 females successfully completed 










The containers, pink occluders, and large rectangular board from Experiment 2 were 




 Pretraining and experimental procedures were similar to those employed in Experiment 2 
with the exception that 24 trials were run in the visible condition and 6 trials in the hidden condition. 
All visible trials were run prior to hidden trials. Additionally, only the static point group was 




All experimental trials were recorded and analyzed in a similar manner to Experiment 1. 
Interrater reliability was κ = 0.94. 
 
Results & Discussion 
  
Dogs’ choices in Experiment 3 are depicted in Figure 3. We first divided 
the 24 visible trials into 4 blocks of 6 trials each. We then conducted a repeated 
measures ANOVA with block as a within-subjects variable. This revealed a 
significant main effect of block (F(1,7) = 30.74, p < 0.01). This indicated that dogs 
improved their accuracy with repeated trials. Next, we conducted one-sample t 
tests for each block to determine when dogs first began to perform at above-chance 
levels. These tests indicated that dogs located the treat significantly above chance 
beginning in block 3 (t(7) = 3.27, p = 0.01) and continued this performance in 
block 4 (t(7) = 6.36, p < 0.01). These results indicate that dogs can, with enough 
practice, learn to inhibit following a static pointing gesture when the reward is 
visible during choice.  
Next, we evaluated dogs’ performance during hidden trials using a one-
sample t test. This indicated that dogs did not perform significantly better than 
chance when the treat was not visible during choice. Instead, they reverted to 
choosing the location indicated by the demonstrator’s static point (t(7) = 3.87, p = 
0.01). This suggests that when information about the treat’s location is no longer 











Figure 3. Proportion of correct choices for visible and hidden trials in Experiment 3. Results are 




In three experiments, we explored the role of human gesturing, namely 
static points, in dogs’ choice behavior. In particular, we explored whether dogs, 
like human children (Couillard & Woodward, 1999), would have difficulty 
interpreting a static pointing gesture emitted by a human in a new (contradictory) 
way and if so, under which conditions.  
Past research with dogs has indicated that they are highly sensitive to a 
variety of human gestures, including static points (e.g., Agnetta et al., 2000; 
McKinley & Sambrook, 2000; Soproni et al., 2001, 2002). However, most studies 
have focused on the role of honest gestures. For example, in a study employing 
honest and deceptive static points, Petter and colleagues (2009) found that dogs 
learned to approach the cooperative human more often than the deceptive human. 
However, dogs continued to approach the deceiver on many trials despite not 
receiving a food reward for their approach, suggesting that they, like young human 
children (Couillard & Woodward, 1999), have difficulty interpreting a static point 
in a novel way. However, the role of the human indicator’s static point in this 
continued approach was not directly evaluated by Petter and colleagues (2009). 
Our experiments differ from those of Petter and colleagues in that we sought to 
directly evaluate the role of the static point specifically and dissociate the static 
point gesture from the mere presence of a human as a cue for food. 
First, we were specifically interested in whether dogs’ familiarity with the 
deceiver would affect performance. We reasoned that dogs might have more 
experience following the pointing gestures of their owner and would therefore be 
more likely to continue to follow deceptive gestures from their owner than from an 







demonstrator familiarity. For some dogs, the deceiver was very familiar to them 
(their owner), whereas for other dogs the deceiver was an unfamiliar person (an 
experimenter). The results of the experiment indicated that dogs chose the 
container indicated by the demonstrators’ deceptive points regardless of whether 
the demonstrator was familiar or unfamiliar to them. However, dogs were more 
likely to refuse to make a choice when an unfamiliar individual served as the 
deceiver.  
While we did not directly explore why dogs were more likely to refuse to 
make choices for an unfamiliar demonstrator, it is possible that dogs’ perception of 
the context of their task differed between groups. For instance, it is possible that 
dogs interpreted their owner’s actions as part of a game (potentially leading to 
higher engagement), but did not make this same interpretation for the unfamiliar 
demonstrator. Overall, these results suggest that dogs readily follow a human’s 
static point cue, even when the cue does not provide useful information to locate a 
food reward, regardless of familiarity with the deceiver. This expands on the work 
of Petter and colleagues (2009) in that their demonstrators were always unfamiliar 
to the dog. 
Additionally, we expanded on Petter and colleagues’ (2009) work by 
exploring the role of multiple cue types (static point, stand behind unbaited 
container, momentary point) in Experiment 2 when the treat was both visually 
available and hidden. We compared performance for both visible and hidden trials 
to a control condition in which the demonstrator gave no cues regarding the 
location of the food reward (no cue). While dogs were able to choose the baited 
container when information about which container the treat was in was visually 
available at choice in the momentary point, stand, and no cues condition, dogs 
were unable to perform at an above-chance level in the static point condition. 
When dogs could not detect the location of the treat visually through the 
containers’ walls, dogs maintained their successful performance in the momentary 
point and stand conditions. However, they performed at chance in the no cues 
condition and reverted to following the demonstrator’s gesture in the static point 
condition. The results suggested dogs had difficulty inhibiting their approach to a 
location indicated by a static point even when they could see the location of the 
treat by looking through the containers’ walls. This experiment is informative in 
that it provides additional evidence that dogs’ use of static points differs from the 
other gesture types explored here. In particular, dogs’ difficulty inhibiting 
approach directed by a static point in comparison to the stand condition in which 
the demonstrator’s body position indicated the unbaited container suggests the 
static point itself offers information to the dog beyond what is offered by a 
human’s body position alone.    
Given dogs’ difficulty inhibiting following of dishonest human points, we 
explored in Experiment 3 whether additional training would improve dogs’ 
performance. Our results indicated dogs did learn, with additional practice, to 
inhibit following of a static point gesture when the location of the food reward was 
visible through the containers’ walls. However, when the location of the food 







following a humans’ static point gesture. Future research might explore whether 
substantially more training when the treat can be visually located through the 
containers’ walls might improve later performance when the location of the treat is 
made visually unavailable at the time of choice.   
In conjunction, this work suggests that dogs, like human children 
(Couillard & Woodward, 1999), do have difficulty interpreting static points in a 
new way in comparison to other types of human cuing (e.g., momentarily pointing 
and body position). In sum, these findings extend the literature on human and non-
human animals in the role of gesturing in choice behavior and suggest that even in 
the presence of conflicting information dogs are heavily influenced by where 
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